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I. INTRODUCTION
The decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
in the Case of the S.S. "Lotus"' has attracted more attention than any of
that court's other opinions,' and its impact as a source of foundational
principles in various areas of international law has been lasting. Hersch
Lauterpacht noted that the decision "forms a mine of valuable material
upon the subject of Jurisdiction,"3 Louis Henkin labeled it "one of the
landmarks of twentieth-century jurisprudence,"4 and Bin Cheng opened
B.A. 1999, Stanford University; M.Sc. 2004, London School of Economics; J.D.
2007, University of Michigan Law School.
I. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7) [hereinafter Lotus].
2. OLE SPIERMANN, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT IN THE PERMANENT COURT
OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: THE RISE OF THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY 247 (2005).
3. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 270 n.2 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 5th ed. 1937).
4. Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 RECUEIL DES
COURS 9, 278 (1989 IV).
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his oft-quoted volume with a full paragraph from Lotus.5 Teachers of
international law routinely use the Lotus principle or presumption-the
PCIJ's pronouncement that "[r]estrictions on the independence of States
cannot... be presumed" 6-as a general departure point for the study of
public international law.7
But Lotus has perhaps drawn as much criticism as affirmation. Ian
Brownlie observes that "[i]n most respects the Judgment of the Court is
unhelpful in its approach to the principles of jurisdiction, and its pro-
nouncements are characterized by vagueness and generality."8 Nor does
there appear to be any clear consensus on the decision's core holdings; in
fact, commentators have read the decision in alarmingly divergent ways.9
This Note avoids the legal cacophony surrounding the specific holdings
of the Lotus decision, focusing instead on the Lotus principle. Scholars
have persistently (and often uncritically) taken the Lotus principle at face
value, citing it for the sweeping proposition that everything that is not
prohibited in international law is permitted.' ° This interpretation of the
principle, if it ever accurately captured the reasoning of the PCIJ in the
Lotus case, no longer appears warranted. But even narrower interpreta-
tions of the principle remain problematic, particularly given the
expansion of international law throughout the twentieth century. This
Note examines various potential interpretations of the Lotus principle
and then queries whether such interpretations find support in the juris-
prudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). It concludes that the
5. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 29 (1953).
6. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18.
7. See John F Murphy & Jeff Atik, International Legal Education, 37 INT'L LAW.
623, 626 (2003) (noting that in the University of Michigan Law School's trend-setting re-
quired course on Transnational Law, the Lotus presumption is taught as a fundamental
international principle, or "[g]roundrule").
8. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 301 (6th ed. 2003).
9. See Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold War: Intelligence and
International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1071, 1081-82 (2006) (citing Lotus for the notion
that extraterritorial exercise of power is impermissible); Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law
Meets Private Law Harmonization: The Coming Conflict, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 211, 278
(2005) (citing Lotus as indicating that international law permits extraterritorial jurisdiction);
see also John Alan Cohan, The Bush Doctrine and the Emerging Norm of Anticipatory Self-
Defense in Customary International Law, 15 PACE INT'L L. REv. 283, 302 (2003) (noting that
Lotus indicates that customary international law binds states regardless of their consent); An-
drew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 115, 141 (2005)
(citing Lotus for the proposition that states cannot be bound by international law absent their
consent).
10. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Reflections on US-Zeroing: A Study in Judicial Over-
reaching by the WTO Appellate Body, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 196, 203 (2006); Tawia
Ansah, War: Rhetoric & Norm-Creation in Response to Terror, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 797, 850
n. 180 (2003); Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in Interna-
tional Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 907, 912 (2005).
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Court, from its early days, has viewed the principle at best as inapposite
and at worst as an inaccurate statement of the principles of international
law.
Part II reviews the factual background of the Lotus decision and the
judgment of the PCIJ. It also outlines potential interpretations of the
Lotus principle given the ambiguity of the decision itself and the varied
ways in which the dissenting judges appeared to interpret the majority
opinion. Part Ill examines the principle through the lens of ICJ decisions
that either potentially or directly implicated it. In contrast to the com-
monplace invocation of the Lotus principle in academic literature, the
ICJ has only infrequently visited the principle in its decisions. This rela-
tive silence should not be interpreted as an indication of support; rather,
the ICJ's choice not to rely on the principle in various instances suggests
that the Court has found it to be of little utility. More important, perhaps,
is that in the few instances in which the Court has addressed the Lotus
principle more directly, its reasoning can logically be construed as repu-
diating the principle's basic premises. The Court's approach to Lotus
calls into question the degree to which the decision should continue to be
viewed as elaborating a "groundrule" of international law."
II. THE LOTUS DECISION AND SUBSEQUENT INTERPRETATION
The facts of the Lotus case are well known. On August 2, 1926, the
S.S. Lotus, a French steamship, collided on the high seas with the Boz-
Kourt, a Turkish collier.'2 The Boz-Kourt split in two and sank, and eight
of its crew members were killed. The Lotus remained to assist the
survivors of the Boz-Kourt, including its captain, Hassan Bey, and then
continued with the survivors to Constantinople. Turkish authorities
subsequently requested that Lieutenant Demons, the officer of the watch
on board the Lotus when the collision occurred, come ashore to give
evidence. At the conclusion of the questioning, Turkish authorities
placed Demons and Hassan Bey under arrest pending trial on charges of
manslaughter. At trial, Demons argued that the Turkish court lacked
jurisdiction, but the court convicted both Demons and Hassan Bey,
sentencing each to a term of imprisonment. The French government
protested the arrest and the conviction and requested that the case be
transferred to a French court. Turkey proposed, and France agreed, to
pose the following question to the PCIJ: "(1) Has Turkey ... acted in
conflict with the principles of international law-and if so, what
11. See Murphy & Atik, supra note 7, at 626.
12. See Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 10-13.
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principles-by instituting ... criminal proceedings in pursuance of
Turkish law against M. Demons...?""
The French government invoked the 1923 Convention of Lausanne
in arguing against Turkish jurisdiction. Article 15 of the Convention in-
dicated that "all questions of jurisdiction shall, as between Turkey and
the other contracting Powers, be decided in accordance with the princi-
ples of international law." 4 France maintained that such principles
precluded criminal jurisdiction in this case. The Court, somewhat sig-
nificantly, condensed the positions of the parties in the following way:
The French Government contends that the Turkish Courts, in or-
der to have jurisdiction, should be able to point to some title to
jurisdiction recognized by international law in favour of Turkey.
On the other hand, the Turkish Government takes the view that
Article 15 allows Turkey jurisdiction whenever such jurisdiction
does not come into conflict with a principle of international
law.5
Having thus framed the question as one inquiring whether international
law is essentially permissive or prohibitive, the Court then issued its fa-
mous dictum:
International law governs relations between independent States.
The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from
their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages
generally accepted as expressing principles of law and estab-
lished in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing
independent communities or with a view to the achievement of
common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States
cannot therefore be presumed.
6
The Court ultimately ruled, in a six-six split with President Huber cast-
ing the deciding vote, that trying Demons was not an exercise of power
on the territory of another State, that the Court could deduce no rule or
principle of international law preventing Turkey from exercising jurisdic-




14. Id. at 16.
15. Id. at 18.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 30-31. Treaty law subsequently rejected the ruling of concurrent jurisdiction
for collisions on the high seas, favoring instead jurisdiction only in the courts of the ship's flag
state or the state of the officer's nationality. See Geneva Convention on the High Seas art. 11,
Apr. 29, 1958, 40 U.N.T.S. 82; U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 97, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
[Vol. 29:71
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A. Majority and Dissent
The apparent majority view-that unless France could prove the ex-
istence of a rule prohibiting Turkey's conduct, the conduct did not
violate international law-has long been considered a classic articulation
of international legal positivism, the notion that "[lI]aw is regarded as a
unified system of rules that ... emanate from state will."'8 The decision
is also closely associated with the voluntarist approach to international
law-in short, "where there is State will, there is international law: no
will, no law."' 9 Of course, like any uncompromising perspective, the ma-
jority view has been subject to significant criticism. J.L. Brierly
complained not long after the decision that the majority opinion
was based on the highly contentious metaphysical proposition of
the extreme positivist school that the law emanates from the free
will of sovereign independent States, and from this premiss ...
that restrictions on the independence of States cannot be pre-
sumed. Neither ... can the absence of restrictions; for we are
not able to deduce the law applicable to a specific state of facts
from the mere fact of sovereignty or independence.20
According to Brierly, the Court's view ignored the substantial develop-
ment of international law as the result of agreement or consensus within
a society of States.'
Brierly's criticism echoed those of the Lotus dissenters, several of
whom expressed doubts that the majority position was consonant with
accepted principles of international law. Judge Loder characterized
Turkey's position as "based on the contention that under international
law everything which is not prohibited is permitted. In other words ...
every door is open unless it is closed by treaty or by established
custom. '22 Judge Weiss claimed that the majority opinion meant that
Turkey "can do as she thinks fit as regards persons or things unless a
specific provision in a treaty or an established custom in international
relations prevents her from so doing. This power is thus in its essence
unlimited .... Judge Nyholm wrote of the majority opinion that "[i]f
18. Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The Responsibility of Individuals for Human
Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 302, 304 (1999).
19. Alain Pellet, The Normative Dilemma: Will and Consent in International Law-
Making, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 22, 22, 26 (1988-89).
20. J.L. Brierly, The 'Lotus' Case, 44 L.Q. REV. 154, 155 (1928), reprinted in THE
BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER PAPERS 143-44 (Sir Hersch Lau-
terpacht ed., 1958).
21. Id.
22. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 34 (dissenting opinion of M. Loder).
23. Id. at 42 (dissenting opinion of M. Weiss).
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this reasoning be followed out, a principle of public international law is
set up that where there is no special rule, absolute freedom must exist."24
The dissenters therefore interpreted the dictum that became the Lotus
principle as applicable beyond the facts of the case-an attempt by the
Court to articulate a general principle of international law that governs
whenever no applicable law constraining state behavior can be
discerned.
It could be argued, however, that the majority did not intend to
promulgate such a sweeping rule of international relations, and that in
fact the dissenters' somewhat exaggerated interpretation of the Lotus
dictum has subsequently been accepted as an accurate expression of the
majority position even if the majority intended a more limited reading.
The majority referred to international law in terms of "co-existing inde-
pendent communities" and "common aims,"'25 hardly language that
seems intended to support a conception of States as benefiting from ab-
solute freedom. As Spiermann notes, "[w]hat the Court had in view was
an international law of cooperation."2 6 Moreover, if the majority did in-
tend to articulate a generally applicable vision of international law as
prohibitive, not permissive, it seemed to depart from that vision immedi-
ately. After declaring that "restrictions upon the independence of States
cannot ... be presumed," the Court proceeded to presume one such re-
striction:
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international
law upon a State is that-failing the existence of a permissive
rule to the contrary-it may not exercise its power in any form
in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is cer-
tainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its
territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from in-
27ternational custom or from a convention.
The phrase "failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary"
appears to undermine directly the vision of international law-a view of
the law as a series of prohibitions, not permissions-that the dissenters
attributed to the majority. Henkin observes that "instead of the presump-
tion of State independence and autonomy, [the Court] seemed to begin
with a presumption that a State was not fully autonomous: it may not
24. Id. at 60 (dissenting opinion of M. Nyholm).
25. Id. at 18.
26. Ole Spiermann, Lotus and the Double Structure of International Legal Argument, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 143
(Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999).
27. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18-19.
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exercise jurisdiction outside its territory."" It may therefore be reason-
able to discount somewhat the dissenters' view of the decision because
the majority may not have intended to pronounce as extreme a principle
as the dissenters claimed. The PCIJ was already deeply divided over the
Lotus decision; if the majority did not intend such an expansive reading,
the traditional understanding of the Lotus principle has always rested on
shaky ground.
B. Potential Interpretations of the Lotus Principle
Determining how the ICJ has interpreted the Lotus principle-or
what various ICJ decisions may indicate about the principle's viability-
requires further inquiry into the various interpretive options that the
principle poses. Given that the principle could be interpreted in various
ways, and given the degree of divergence between the majority and dis-
sent, several possibilities are worth noting.
1. Positivism or Normativity: Is There a Gap in the Law?
Most broadly, the dichotomy between positivism and normativity is
relevant to interpreting the Lotus principle. While strict positivists con-
fine their legal analysis to the law as an objective reality,29 norm-based
theorists expand the analysis to incorporate norms and ideals that may
not appear as "hard" law.30 This dichotomy arises in regard to what quali-
fies as a substantive gap, or lacuna, in international law. If an
international tribunal encounters an area of the law to which no formal
custom or treaties apply, must it necessarily conclude that a gap exists,
or can it invoke "soft" norms or draw on analogous areas of the law to
find that, in fact, there is no gap in the law?
As noted above, Lotus has long been considered the touchstone of
international legal positivism. In its analysis, the majority queried exist-
ing rules and customary international law before concluding that "there
is no rule of international law in regard to [such] collision cases."3'
Moreover, the majority tended to use the terms "rule" and "principle"
interchangeably, requiring either to be explicit in order for it to govern
the case. The dissenters, on the other hand, claimed that requiring the
parties to cite explicit rules was too exacting a burden. Lord Finlay dis-
tinguished between rules and principles, noting that in the compromis
28. Henkin, supra note 4, at 278-79.
29. See Simma & Paulus, supra note 18, at 304.
30. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated
Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHi. L. REv. 469, 481-83 (2005) (surveying norm-based
theories of international law).
31. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 30.
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"[t]here is no mention of any 'rule' but only of 'principles.' , 32 This ap-
proach conceived of principles as a more normative, fungible concept
that would allow the Court to consider fairness to the parties in deter-
mining whether any international law applied. International law was
therefore "a manifestation of international legal ethics" or a "general
consensus of opinion among the countries which have adopted the Euro-
pean system of civilization,"33 not a fixed, unchanging code under which
States labored.
2. Lacuna, Non Liquet, or Law: Does the Gap Survive the Decision?
The foregoing discussion raises the question of how an international
tribunal is to respond if, indeed, it encounters a lacuna in the law. One
way would be to find that municipal law precedes international law and
governs in the absence of international law. This approach would leave
the lacuna in place. Another approach would be to declare a non liquet
and find that "the law does not permit a conclusion one way or the other
concerning the issue in question.'" 34 A non liquet would essentially mean
the court abstains from ruling on the issue, leaving the parties without a
solution.33 Finally, a court could respond to a gap in the law by using a
residual principle or presumption to decide the issue. This approach
would fill gaps in the law through judicial decisionmaking.
The Lotus decision offers fairly conclusive insights on this score. Al-
though some early commentators compared Lotus to non liquet, 6 it
seems clear enough that, despite finding a gap in the law, the PCIJ de-
cided the issue conclusively in favor of Turkey. It also seems clear that
the Court did not rely on municipal law in doing so; it repeatedly em-
phasized that its purpose was to determine "whether or not the principles
of international law prevent Turkey from instituting criminal proceed-
ings against Lieutenant Demons under Turkish law.' 37 That leaves the
final possibility-that the Court was filling a gap in international law
through the application of a residual principle or presumption.
32. Id. at 52 (dissenting opinion by Lord Finlay).
33. Id. at 60 (dissenting opinion by M. Nyholm) (emphasis in original).
34. Daniel Bodansky, Non Liquet and the Incompleteness of International Law, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
supra note 26, at 153, 154 (emphasis in original).
35. Some international jurists have argued that a finding of non liquet is prohibited in
international judicial decisionmaking. See Hersch Lauterpacht, Some Observations on the
Prohibition of "Non Liquet" and the Completeness of the Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW:
COLLECTED PAPERS (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 1975). But see Antonio F. Perez, The Passive
Virtues and the World Court: Pro-Dialogic Abstention by the International Court of Justice,
18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 399 (1997).
36. See SPIERMANN, supra note 2, at 250 n.207.
37. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 15 (emphasis added).
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3. Residual Principle or Presumption: What Form
Should the Response Take?
If an international tribunal is to fill a gap in the law, the difference
between residual principles and presumptions becomes relevant. Ole
Spiermann notes that a residual principle "attaches consequences to an
antecedent .... The principle is 'residual' because the condition (the 'if-
clause') to which it attaches a consequence (the 'then-clause') is the ab-
sence of rules or other principles."" A presumption, on the other hand,
"is the action of supposing something to exist or to be true."39 A residual
principle need not presume anything: it might only apply when it is clear
that there are no rules. If it is undetermined whether other rules or prin-
ciples pertain to a situation, a residual principle would apply only
through the use of a presumption of some kind. For instance, when the
rules are unclear, it could be presumed that there are no rules, allowing
application of a residual principle.
Applying this distinction to Lotus yields three possibilities. First, the
Lotus principle could be interpreted as a pure residual principle: when
there are no other governing principles or rules of international law,
States are free to act as they please. The majority opinion clearly could
be read this way, as it first endeavored to "ascertain whether or not there
exists a rule of international law limiting the freedom of States to extend
the criminal jurisdiction of their courts" to collisions on the high seas.40
When the Court concluded that there was no such rule,' it applied the
residual principle of freedom of action and ruled that Turkey had not
violated international law.
Second, the Lotus principle could be interpreted as a residual princi-
ple to which a presumption is attached: when it is unclear whether rules
of international law apply to a situation, it is presumed that there are no
rules and that States are free to act. This perspective could be attributed
to Judges Moore and Altamira, whose primary disputes with the majority
opinion appeared to involve the conclusion that no rule of international
law governed, not the underlying premise of freedom of action.42 Brierly
may also have assumed this to be the majority's approach when he criti-
cized it by arguing that "we are not entitled to deduce the law applicable
38. Spiermann, supra note 26, at 132.
39. Id. at 133.
40. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 21.
41. Id. at 30.
42. See id. at 94, 102. Altamira wrote that "a State which ... acts so as to impose, by
virtue of the principle of the admitted freedom in internal legislation, and in disregard of the
principle whereby consent is requisite, further exceptions to another principle ... will have
acted in contravention of international law." Id. at 104.
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Finally, the Lotus principle could be interpreted as a pure presump-
tion: States are presumed to be unrestrained by international law absent
some proof of restraint. Under this conception, the "burden of proof' in
determining whether international law restrains a State lies with the State
alleging the existence of the restraint. Most of the dissenters appear to
have interpreted the majority opinion this way, leading to their com-
plaints that according to the majority, "every door is open unless it is
closed by treaty,"' or "where there is no special rule, absolute freedom
must exist"
45
It is worth noting that, regardless of whether the Court was applying
a residual principle, a presumption, or a combination of the two, the Lo-
tus principle would appear to foreclose the possibility of an international
tribunal ever leaving a substantive gap in place or declaring a non li-
quet.46 As a catch-all tool for deciding issues in the face of
incompleteness or ambiguity in international law, the Lotus principle
should mean that international law is complete.
III. THE LOTUS PRINCIPLE IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ICJ
Part II reviewed the facts of the Lotus decision, the positions of the
majority and dissent, and various interpretive possibilities the decision
presents. Part III will now attempt to discern the position of the ICJ on
the Lotus principle given various decisions that have (or could have) im-
plicated it. A word on precedent is warranted here. Although the ICJ is
not technically bound by its own decisions, the Court clearly relies on
them as highly persuasive sources of authority on points of law.47 The
Court also has sought to establish consistency in its jurisprudence
throughout its existence. It therefore makes sense to examine the long-
term posture of the ICJ toward the Lotus principle and query what this
posture indicates about the principle's viability both at the Court's incep-
tion and today.
The ICJ has only rarely construed the Lotus case. In fact, Lotus ap-
pears only three times in ICJ decisions on the merits, 48 and of those, only
43. Brierly, supra note 20, at 144.
44. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 34 (dissenting opinion of M. Loder).
45. Id. at 60 (dissenting opinion of M. Nyholm).
46. See Bodansky, supra note 34, at 161-65.
47. See generally MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT
(1996).
48. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 238-39 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]; Military and Paramilitary Activities
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one, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, refers directly to
the Lotus principle. 9 Various separate or dissenting opinions mention
Lotus and its specific holdings, but again, few address the Lotus princi-
ple itself. On the one hand, this general reticence is surprising,
considering that parties to contentious proceedings and amici curiae
have more frequently referred to the Lotus principle in their submissions.
The Court has had plenty of opportunities to interpret the principle and
generally has chosen not to do so. On the other hand, the ICJ's silence on
the Lotus principle is entirely understandable given that, regardless of
how the Court were to interpret the principle, doing so would involve
broad, sweeping issues of state sovereignty and freedom of action, areas
that clearly warrant caution in judicial decisionmaking. Still, the ICJ's
silence notwithstanding, it is possible to discern the Court's position on
the Lotus principle through the separate opinions of the judges, the rare
occasions in which the Court has construed the principle, and, indeed,
the instances in which the Court has chosen not to address the principle.
The following sections trace the Court's treatment of the principle (or
lack thereof), beginning with its early decisions and continuing through
more recent cases.
A. Early Skepticism
The ICJ's early cases present some insights into the Court's initial
approach to the Lotus principle and suggest that the Court sought to dis-
tance itself in many respects from the general precepts of the principle.
In Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,0
the ICJ faced an early test of its willingness to infer or imply powers that
were not explicitly enumerated in an international agreement. The U.N.
General Assembly referred to the ICJ the question of whether the United
Nations can bring a claim against a State when U.N. personnel are in-
jured in a manner that implicates the responsibility of that State. The
Court therefore confronted the threshold question of whether the United
Nations was an international legal person, which it answered in the af-
firmative. It also concluded that the United Nations had the power to
bring a claim against a responsible government for injuries to its person-
nel.5'
Although neither the Court nor any of the parties who submitted
briefs mentioned the Lotus principle, the holdings and reasoning of the
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 24 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]; North Sea Continental
Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., FR.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3,44 (Feb. 20).
49. Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 238-39.
50. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of United Nations, Advisory Opinion,
1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11) [hereinafter U.N. Reparations].
51. Id. at 180-81.
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Court do shed light on some of the principle's core elements. Most gen-
erally, the Court's opinion cut against the primary ontological foundation
of the Lotus principle-that "[international law governs relations be-
tween independent States. 52 The finding that the United Nations is an
international legal person did not completely obviate this part of the Lo-
tus principle, but it did carve out a new species of obligation in
international law from what had previously been the exclusive preserve
of States. Similarly, if the Lotus principle is taken to mean that the pow-
ers or duties that flow from a treaty must be explicitly enumerated in the
treaty and cannot be inferred from it, the U.N. Reparations case chal-
lenged the principle on that score as well. The Court opined that "[u]nder
international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers
which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon
it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its
duties" "3 This statement distanced the Court from the more strictly posi-
tivist orientation of the Lotus majority.-4 Finally, despite the dearth of
available "hard" law on the matter, the Court seemed to avoid conclud-
ing at any point that it faced a gap in the law, which could have required
it to choose a method for filling the gap. Instead, the Court explained
that the U.N. Charter and the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations necessarily implied legal personality
for the United Nations. 5 The Lotus principle therefore did not come into
play.
Another early decision, the Asylum Case (Colombia/Peru),6 is rele-
vant to understanding the ICJ's initial posture toward the Lotus principle.
After the leader of a political rebellion in Peru took refuge in the Co-
lombian embassy in Lima, Colombia offered him political asylum and
requested that the Peruvian authorities grant him safe conduct out of the
country. In contentious proceedings before the ICJ, Colombia claimed
that it had the right to qualify the offense with which the leader had been
charged as political, making him eligible for asylum. The Colombian
government cited, inter alia, the Bolivarian Agreement of 1911, in which
signatories recognized the institution of asylum "in conformity with the
principles of international law.
' 57
In ruling against Colombia, the ICJ noted that "the principles of in-
ternational law do not recognize any rule of unilateral and definitive
52. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18.
53. U.N. Reparations, 1949 I.C.J. at 182 (emphasis added).
54. See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 285 n. 114 (Robert W.
Tucker rev. & ed., 1966) (1952).
55. U.N. Reparations, 1949 I.C.J. at 179.
56. 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20).
57. Id. at 274.
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qualification by the State granting diplomatic asylum.""8 The Court went
on to conclude that none of the other bases advanced by Colombia estab-
lished the existence of the right. The Court therefore confronted a gap, or
at least ambiguity in the law, roughly analogous to that of the Lotus case,
particularly in that the most relevant convention, the Bolivarian Agree-
ment, referred only to general principles of international law. Yet, rather
than requiring Peru to show that Colombia's conduct was prohibited un-
der international law-or resolving the apparent ambiguity in the law in
favor of Colombia's freedom of action-the Court prioritized Peru's ter-
ritorial sovereignty and required Colombia to show that its conduct was
permitted under international law. This approach could be read as indi-
cating that, even if the Lotus principle could be considered residual, it
was subject to the countervailing logic of other residual principles-in
this case, territorial sovereignty. Regardless, the judgment seemed to
reject implicitly the notion that Lotus required a presumption in favor of
Colombia's autonomy and independence.
Finally, in the Fisheries Case (United Kingdom/Norway), 9 the ma-
jority's reasoning again foreclosed direct treatment of the Lotus
principle, but the Court's underlying attitude was one of hostility to the
principle. When the United Kingdom challenged Norway's delimitation
of its territorial sea as inconsistent with international law, Norway cited
the Lotus principle in arguing that doubt over the legality of Norway's
"act of sovereignty" had to be construed in its favor, because a restriction
on that sovereignty could not be presumed.6° The United Kingdom vig-
orously disputed this reading of the Lotus principle, claiming that "the
presumption against restrictions on independence can only operate
within the areas of State activity left in principle by international law to
the discretion of the State.' 6' According to the United Kingdom, because
the matters in dispute in the case were not within Norway's discretion-
and because Norway was seeking to restrict the generally accepted prin-
ciple of freedom of the high seas-Norway's conduct would have to be
justified with a special permissive rule.62 This reading would be consis-
tent with the view of the Lotus principle as a pure residual principle, not
a presumption.
Although the Court ruled against the United Kingdom, it did not do so
on the basis of the Lotus principle. Instead, it concluded that Norway's
58. Id.
59. 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18).
60. Counter-Memorial of Norway, Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. Pleadings
418 (July 31, 1950).
61. Reply of the United Kingdom, Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. Pleadings
461 (Nov. 28, 1950) (emphasis in original).
62. Id. at 463.
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method of delimitation was consistent with international law, and that in
any event the United Kingdom had not objected to Norway's long-term
practice. The Court therefore displayed flexibility in concluding that no
gap in international law existed, making inquiry along the lines of Lotus
unnecessary. In a separate opinion, Judge Alvarez addressed the Lotus
principle directly:
This principle, formerly correct, in the days of absolute sover-
eignty, is no longer so at the present day: the sovereignty of
States is henceforth limited not only by the rights of other States
but also by other factors ... which make up what is called the
new international law: the Charter of the United Nations, resolu-
tions passed by the Assembly of the United Nations, the duties
of States, the general interests of international society and lastly
the prohibition of abus de droit.64
Although not part of the majority opinion, this broad rebuke of the Lotus
principle reflects the Court's general departure from strict positivism at
the time. It also underscores the Court's willingness to draw on new
sources of international law, bypassing altogether any analysis that
would implicate the Lotus principle.
B. 1960s-1980s: Ambiguity
The ICJ's early (if largely implicit) rejection of the Lotus principle
was followed by a period of ambiguity in which the Court flirted with a
resurrection of the PCIJ's positivist tradition but also displayed contin-
ued doubt about the viability and scope of the Lotus principle. In the
South West Africa cases, the Court essentially ruled that Ethiopia and
Liberia did not have standing to challenge South Africa's conduct in
South West Africa under the League of Nations mandate system. 5 In so
ruling, the Court took pains to remind the parties that the ICJ "is a court
of law, and can take account of moral principles only in so far as these
are given a sufficient expression in legal form."6 It rejected the notion
that principles such as the "sacred trust of civilization" could be used to
derive applicable legal rules: "the principle of the sacred trust has no
residual juridical content which could ... operate per se to give rise to
legal rights and obligations ... and... such rights and obligations exist
only in so far as there is actual provision for them.' '67 In this way, the
63. See Fisheries, 1951 I.C.J. at 132.
64. Id. at 152 (separate opinion of Judge Alvarez).
65. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Aft., Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18).
66. Id. at 34.
67. Id. at 35.
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Court seemed to reposition itself much closer to the formal, positivist
approach of the Lotus majority on the issue of the permissible sources of
international law. Still, despite this call to formalism, the Court did not
renounce its ability to infer or imply legal rights and obligations from
sources other than "hard" law. Indeed, the Court during this period de-
veloped significant judicial mechanisms-such as the use of the
principle of equity in maritime delimitation-that lacked the hard law
pedigree of the Court's traditional decisionmaking tools."
More significantly, in Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Ice-
land),69 the Court appeared not only unwilling to embrace a strictly
positivist outlook, but also unreceptive to the logic of the Lotus principle.
Following the general reasoning of South West Africa may not have al-
lowed the Court, as it did in Fisheries Jurisdiction, to invoke equitable
principles as a basis for its specific holdings or to require the parties to
negotiate in good faith over the degree to which U.K. vessels would be
granted access to the area in question. Moreover, in ruling that Iceland
could not unilaterally exclude U.K. vessels from fishing in the area just
beyond its territorial sea,7° the Court implicitly rejected Iceland's claim
that the Lotus principle enabled it to declare that area exclusively within
its jurisdiction. Judge Dillard, concurring in the majority opinion, found
it necessary to address Lotus directly. Responding to Iceland's argument
that the divergence in state practice on the matter-and the United King-
dom's failure to prove the existence of a prohibition on Iceland's
conduct-left a lacuna in the law in which Iceland was free to operate,
Dillard opined:
while the burden of proof problem may have some relevance in
determining factual and jurisdictional issues, it has little bearing
on the present case. Likewise with the notion of freedom of
State action. Borrowing from Lauterpacht, I would put the mat-
ter as follows: if the exercise of freedom trespasses on the
interests of other States then the issue arises as to its justifica-
tion. This the Court must determine in light of the applicable law
and it does not advance the enquiry to attempt to indulge in a
presumption or to lean on a burden of proof."
Dillard's pragmatic approach therefore squarely denied the viability of
Lotus as an across-the-board presumption, or even residual principle,
68. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (ER.G. v. Den., ER.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J.
3 (Feb. 20); Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18 (Feb. 24); Continental Shelf
(Libya v. Tunis.), 1985 I.C.J. 13 (June 3).
69. 1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25).
70. Id. at 34.
71. Id. at 59 (separate opinion of Judge Dillard) (internal citations omitted).
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that could be applied with consistency in international law. In its place,
he offered the simple requirement that conduct that negatively affects the
interests of other States must be justified.
Still, Fisheries Jurisdiction did not present the Court with a situation
in which no treaties, agreements, or customary international law could
be said to govern a matter, leaving open the question of whether the
Court would have to find a lacuna in the law in such a context and pro-
ceed accordingly. The Court encountered such a lacuna in Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States) (Nicaragua), and it
adhered to a Lotus-like approach to state freedom of action. The United
States had argued that Nicaragua's purchase and stockpiling of arms
amounted to such over-militarization as to justify countermeasures. The
Court roundly rejected this argument: "in international law there are no
rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the State concerned,
by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign
State can be limited, and this principle is valid for all States without ex-
,72ception. ' This position appears consonant with the notion of Lotus as a
residual principle: in the absence of applicable law governing the level of
military weaponry a State can maintain, the State is at liberty to maintain
the level it chooses. Although that reasoning did not encompass a situa-
tion in which the applicable law was indeterminate, the position of the
Court still appeared to favor the general formula of the Lotus principle. 3
This approach is unsurprising given that, in the words of the Court, "[a]
State's domestic policy falls within its exclusive jurisdiction, provided of
course that it does not violate any obligation of international law. Every
State possesses a fundamental right to choose and implement its own
political, economic and social systems. 74 In this way, the Court empha-
sized that state sovereignty remained a core value in international law,
but because this was relatively uncontroversial, the implications of the
Nicaragua decision for the viability of the Lotus principle during this
period should not be overstated.
C. The Nuclear Weapons Opinion
In December 1994, the U.N. General Assembly referred to the Court
the following question: "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any
circumstance permitted under international law?" The resulting advisory
opinion involved the most extensive treatment of the Lotus principle in
the ICJ's history. Indeed, the declarations and separate opinions of the
judges offer a range of insights into the Court's perspective on the prin-
72. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 135.
73. See Spiermann, supra note 26, at 132-33.
74. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 131.
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ciple, despite the fact that the opinion itself only briefly addresses it. The
Court's opinion spawned academic debate, some of which has discussed
the subsequent status of the Lotus principle,7 but few commentators have
critically evaluated the opinion in light of the Court's previous posture
toward the principle or the various potential interpretations of it. This
section attempts to do so, first by inquiring into what the dispositif itself
says about the Lotus principle, then by reviewing the broader reasoning
of the opinion, and, finally, by examining the individual positions of the
judges. On balance, the Nuclear Weapons opinion establishes more ex-
plicitly what the ICJ had already signaled quietly: that neither a strict
interpretation of the Lotus principle nor a general presumption of legality
in the absence of a prohibition accords with the Court's view of interna-
tional law today.
1. The Dispositif
Several important conclusions involving the Lotus principle can be
gleaned from the dispositif alone. Following the paragraphs of the dispo-
sitif as a line of logic that could have implicated the Lotus principle
underscores the degree to which the Court did not adhere to the princi-
ple. Major nuclear-weapons States had submitted to the Court
straightforward arguments under Lotus. The following passage from the
U.S. submission is representative:
It is a fundamental principle of international law that restrictions
on States cannot be presumed but must be found in conventional
law specifically accepted by them or in customary law generally
accepted by the community of nations. There is no general pro-
hibition on the use of nuclear weapons in any international
agreement. There is likewise no such prohibition in customary
international law.76
The Court structured the dispositif in a way that partly corresponded to the
basic premises of the Lotus principle-that is, it queried whether interna-
tional law contained a specific prohibition on the threat or use of nuclear
weapons. However, the Court first concluded unanimously in paragraph
(2)A that "[t]here is in neither customary nor conventional international
law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.
'77
75. See generally INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND
NUCLEAR WEAPONS, supra note 26.
76. Written Statement of the Government of the United States of America Concerning
Request of United Nations General Assembly for Advisory Opinion on Legality of Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, at 8, Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (June 20, 1995), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/9518700.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
77. Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 266 (emphasis added).
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The very inclusion of this statement (not to mention the Court's unanim-
ity on it) is anathema to the notion of the Lotus principle as a
presumption, for under that approach the existence or non-existence of
an authorization for conduct is irrelevant-only a prohibition would mat-
ter.
The Court next turned to the issue of prohibition. In paragraph (2)B,
it concluded by eleven votes to three that "[t]here is in neither customary
nor conventional international law any comprehensive and universal pro-
hibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such. '8 The Court
therefore determined that international law did not provide a specific
answer to the question of the legality of a threat or use of nuclear weap-
ons per se. What follows from this conclusion is thus highly relevant to
understanding the Court's position on non liquet or the potential use of a
residual principle. A strict interpretation of Lotus as a residual principle
would have dictated that, because formal, "customary or conventional"
international law did not provide an answer, States must be free to act,
and the threat or use of nuclear weapons must be permissible.
The Court did not adopt this approach. Instead, in paragraphs (2)C
and D, it noted that a threat or use of nuclear weapons that did not com-
ply with either the requirements for the use of force in the U.N. Charter
or international humanitarian law would be unlawful.79 Read separately,
these paragraphs would seem to indicate that the threat or use of nuclear
weapons must ultimately be permissible; otherwise the Court would not
need to indicate the applicable bodies of law governing their use. But the
ensuing paragraphs do not support that reading. In paragraph (2)E, the
Court concluded (by seven votes to seven, by the President's casting
vote) that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be con-
trary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in
particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law."+ Progressing as
the Court did here from the indeterminacy of the law on the specific mat-
ter at hand-the lack of either an authorization or a prohibition per se-
to the likelihood that it is generally illegal is incompatible with the no-
tion of Lotus as a residual principle combined with a presumption.
Indeterminacy would mean applying the residual principle of freedom of
action, not positing that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is generally
"contrary to the rules of international law."
The second part of paragraph (2)E also eschews application of a
Lotus-like residual principle. After concluding that the threat or use of
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"[hiowever, in view of the current state of international law ... the Court
cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weap-
ons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-
defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.' 8' This
conclusion looks remarkably like non liquet, which may not be surpris-
ing given the hypothetical nature of the question posed to the Court and
the fact that it was issuing an advisory opinion. Some controversy has
arisen over whether the Court's decision does constitute non liquet and,
if so, whether such an outcome is permissible.82 Nonetheless, the Court's
conclusion indicates at the very least that it chose not to embrace a re-
sidual principle of freedom of state action even in extreme
circumstances; instead, the Court decided this was one instance (perhaps
one of the very few) in which a specific determination of legality or ille-
gality need not be made.
Taken together, the paragraphs of the dispositif therefore suggest that
the Court did not look favorably on the Lotus principle as a presumption,
a residual principle, or a combination of the two. The possibility that the
decision amounted to non liquet reinforces this conclusion, because as
noted above, non liquet should not have been possible if a residual prin-
ciple of freedom of state action were at play.
2. The Court's Reasoning in the Motifs
The Court's approach in the motifs provides support for, and further
insight into, the foregoing conclusions. The logical starting point is the
passage in which the Court addressed the Lotus principle directly. Nu-
clear-weapons States had argued not only that the principle dictated a
presumption of the legality of nuclear weapons in the absence of specific
prohibitions, but also that the phrasing of the question posed to the
Court-whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was "in any circum-
stance permitted"--conflicted with the "very basis of international law,"
which dictates that "States are free to threaten or use nuclear weapons
unless it can be shown that they are bound not to do so by reference to a
81. Id.
82. See id. at 590 (dissenting opinion of Judge Higgins) ("That the formula chosen is a
non liquet cannot be doubted...."); id. at 389 (dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen)
("There is no Non Liquet."); cf id. at 279 (declaration of Judge Vereshchetin) (arguing that the
prohibition on non liquet should apply only to contentious proceedings, not advisory proceed-
ings); id. at 390 (dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen) ("The fact that these are advisory
proceedings and not contentious ones makes no difference; the law to be applied is the same in
both cases."); see also Bodansky, supra note 34; Richard A. Falk, Nuclear Weapons, Interna-
tional Law and the World Court: A Historic Encounter, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 64, 73 (1997);
Timothy L.H. McCormack, A Non Liquet on Nuclear Weapons-The ICJ Avoids the Applica-
tion of General Principles of International Humanitarian Law, 316 INT'L REV. RED CROss 76
(1997); Perez, supra note 35.
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prohibition in either treaty law or customary international law."8 3 The
Court acknowledged the PCIJ's famous "dicta" from Lotus-that "re-
strictions upon the independence of States cannot ... be presumed"' ' -
and noted similar language from the Nicaragua decision, which it also
labeled dictum.85
In this way, the Court confronted the Lotus principle directly for the
first time in its history. Its response was not supportive. The Court dis-
posed of these arguments by noting that nuclear-weapons States had
accepted that their independence to act was limited by international hu-
manitarian law; "[h]ence, the argument concerning the legal conclusions
to be drawn from the use of the word 'permitted,' and the questions of
burden of proof to which it is said to give rise, are without particular sig-
nificance for the disposition of the issues before the Court."86 Two
conclusions can reasonably be drawn from this approach. First, the Court
suggested that the only instance in which the Lotus principle would
come into play would be one in which no principles or rules of interna-
tional law could be said to restrict the state behavior in question. Second,
any such rules or principles, in order to be considered applicable law,
need not be explicitly intended to govern a specific factual situation. To-
gether these conclusions amount to an extraordinarily exacting definition
of what constitutes a lacuna. Despite the Court's finding that interna-
tional law did not provide an answer on the specific issue of the threat or
use of nuclear weapons, the Court's reasoning indicated that broader
principles embedded within bodies of law-in this case humanitarian
law--can serve as the basis for deciding the question. Therefore, there
was no lacuna in the law, and the Lotus principle did not factor into this
decision, which explains why the logic of the dispositif does not accord
with the Lotus principle. Indeed, one is left wondering when, if ever, the
Lotus principle could apply in today's international system.
Throughout the rest of the motifs, the Court remained consistently
open to the possibility that the applicable law-in essence, the determi-
nation that no lacuna existed and that the Lotus principle was inapt-
could come from various sources, not all of them of the traditionally
positivist type. Immediately after disposing of the arguments invoking
the Lotus principle, the Court continued its opinion this way: "In seeking
to answer the question put to it ... the Court must decide, after consid-
eration of the great corpus of international law norms available to it,
what might be the relevant applicable law.' 87 By framing its inquiry in
83. Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 238.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 239.
87. Id.
[Vol. 29:71
The Lotus Principle in ICJ Jurisprudence
terms of "international norms," the Court ensured that a broad range of
potential sources-including international environmental law, interna-
tional human rights law, humanitarian law, or U.N. resolutions-would
be available in evaluating the question. The likelihood of finding a gap in
the law in which anything akin to the Lotus principle might operate was
therefore virtually nil. This more normative outlook also found form in
the final paragraph of the dispositif, in which the Court unanimously
identified "an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclu-
sion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under
strict and effective international control."88
3. The Separate Opinions of the Judges
While the dispositif and the Court's direct treatment of the Lotus
principle speak for themselves, the separate and dissenting opinions of
the judges in the Nuclear Weapons case confirm that skepticism of the
Lotus principle ran deep on the bench. Judge Bedjaoui argued that the
principle should be limited to the facts of the Lotus case:
It would be to exaggerate the importance of that decision.., and
to distort its scope were it to be divorced from the particular con-
text, both judicial and temporal, in which it was taken. No doubt
this decision expressed the spirit of the times, the spirit of an in-
ternational society which as yet had few institutions and was
governed by an international law of strict coexistence, itself a re-
flection of the vigour of the principle of State sovereignty. It
scarcely needs to be said that the face of contemporary interna-
tional society is markedly altered.89
Judge Bedjaoui sought to ensure that the Court's opinion would be inter-
preted as a rejection of the Lotus principle, noting that "from the
uncertainties surrounding the law and the facts [the Court] does not infer
any freedom to take a position. Nor does it suggest that such license
could in any way whatever be deduced therefrom." According to Bed-
jaoui, any observers who assumed the legality of nuclear weapons from
the indeterminacy of the Court's opinion would be mistaken.
Each of the three judges who dissented on the issue of whether cus-
tomary or conventional international law prohibited the threat or use of
nuclear weapons per se objected to the form of that inquiry-a form that
could be taken as supporting the basic structure of the Lotus principle.
88. Id. at 267.
89. Id. at 270 (separate opinion of Judge Bedjaoui) (emphasis in original); see also id.
at 495 (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry) (arguing that the Lotus decision adjudged a
context far removed from that which the Court faced in the Nuclear Weapons case).
90. Id. at 271 (separate opinion of Judge Bedjaoui).
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Echoing J.L. Brierly, Judge Koroma argued that "the futile quest for spe-
cific legal prohibition can only be attributable to an extreme form of
positivism, which is out of keeping with the international jurispru-
dence-including that of this Court."9 Judge Weeramantry also
condemned the search for a specific prohibition as outmoded:
It would be an interpretation totally out of context that the
"Lotus" decision formulated a theory, equally applicable in
peace and war, to the effect that a State could do whatever it
pleased so long as it had not bound itself to the contrary. Such an
interpretation of "Lotus" would cast a baneful spell on the pro-
gressive development of international law.
92
Judge Shahabuddeen, in particular, disapproved of the formulation in
paragraphs (2)A and B of the dispositif, claiming that it led to the con-
clusion "[o]n the received view of the Lotus decision" that States have a
right to use nuclear weapons-a conclusion with which he disagreed. 93
According to him, the Lotus decision "does not preclude a holding that
there is no right to do such an act unless the act is one which is author-
ized under international law."94
Although these judges dissented because they felt the Court should
have gone further in declaring the outright illegality of the threat or use
of nuclear weapons, there is good reason to believe their general unwill-
ingness to apply the Lotus principle enjoyed the support of the majority
of the Court. In addition to the direct repudiation of the principle in the
opinions of Judges Bedjaoui, Koroma, Weeramantry, and Shahabuddeen,
a more subtle rejection can be detected in the opinions of Judges Ran-
jeva,9' Vereshchetin (in light of his view on the permissibility of non
liquet), and Fleischhauer. The portion of Judge Fleischhauer's opinion
that appears most pertinent to the Lotus principle is illuminating:
The principles and rules of the humanitarian law and the other
principles of law applicable in armed conflict ... are all princi-
ples and rules of law. None of these principles and rules is above
the law, they are of equal rank in law and they can be altered by
law. They are justiciable ... In view of their equal ranking this
91. Id. at 575 (dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma).
92. Id. at 495 (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry).
93. Id. at 390 (dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
94. Id. at 394 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 294 (separate opinion of Judge Ranjeva) ("The absence of a direct and spe-
cific reference to nuclear weapons cannot be used to justify the legality, even indirect, of the
threat or use of nuclear weapons.").
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means that, if the need arises, the smallest common denominator
between the conflicting principles and rules has to be found.
9
In other words, in the absence of a specific authorization or prohibition
on the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the Court must arrive at a solu-
tion by inquiring into the overlapping elements of various coequal
principles. Thus, no residual principle or presumption should be priori-
tized or applied. The only judge who explicitly indicated support for the
Lotus principle was Judge Guillaume.7
IV. CONCLUSION
Aside from its opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case, the ICJ gener-
ally has not seen fit to address the Lotus principle squarely. Scholars,
practitioners, and parties to proceedings before the Court therefore have
continued to invoke the principle as a cornerstone of the international
legal cathedral. Yet the principle's very popularity and status as a
"groundrule"-not to mention its breadth and ambiguity-may have
emptied it of its substantive content over the years, rendering it a plati-
tude without any commonly accepted meaning in the field. A more
rigorous inquiry into the Lotus principle yields various interpretive pos-
sibilities, many of which originate in the PCIJ's opinion itself and belie
the notion that the opinion announced clear-cut, axiomatic rules. But
even accounting for these richer, more nuanced readings of the Lotus
opinion, little support can be found for the principle in the jurisprudence
of the ICJ. When faced with the opportunity to apply the principle or
something akin to it, the Court consistently has chosen routes that ensure
that recourse to principle will not be necessary. When such circumven-
tion has been more difficult-as in the Nuclear Weapons case-the
Court's reasoning has suggested it sees the principle as unhelpful or out-
dated.
In Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of]] April 2000,"8 the Court
again addressed the Lotus principle indirectly. Belgium cited Lotus in
arguing that no rule of international law prevented it from opening an
investigation into, and issuing an arrest warrant against, a foreign official
who was not on its territory, making those actions permissible.99 The
Court ruled against Belgium on the merits without specifically address-
ing the Lotus principle. In a joint separate opinion, however, Judges
96. Id. at 308 (separate opinion of Judge Fleischhauer).
97. Id. at 291 (separate opinion of Judge Guillaume).
98. (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 1 (Feb. 14) [hereinafter Arrest Warrant].
99. Counter Memorial of the Kingdom of Belgium, 3.3.29 (Sept. 28, 2001), Arrest
Warrant, 2002 I.C.J. 1.
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Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal noted that while the PCU's pro-
nouncements on international criminal jurisdiction retained value, the
Lotus principle "represents the high water mark of laissez-faire in inter-
national relations, and an era that has been significantly overtaken by
other tendencies. ' °° In light of the Court's unreceptive attitude toward
the Lotus principle in the Nuclear Weapons case, this acknowledgement
is a further indication that the Court will be wary of attempts to invoke it
in the future.
100. Arrest Warrant, 2002 I.C.J. at 78 (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooi-
jmans, and Buergenthal).
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